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Cryptography, Statistics and Pseudo-Randomness
(Part II)
Stefan Brands Richard Gilly
Abstract
This paper is a sequel to Brands and Gill (1995), which contained an introduction to the
cryptographic theory of random number generation. Here we give a detailed analysis of the
QR-generator.
1 The QR-generator is pseudo-random.
Recall from Brands and Gill (1995) that the QR-generator is defined as follows: for suitably
chosen integers x0 and m, define
x
n


x
2
n1 modm if x2n1 modm  m2;
m x
2
n1 modm otherwise.
1
and let
y
n
 lsbx
n

denote the least significant bit of x
n
. From the theoretical construction of Blum and Micali, it
is clear that the proof of pseudo-randomness of the QR-generator is complete if it can be shown
that the function displayed in (1) defines a one-way permutation under the plausible assumption
that it is infeasible to factor Blum integers, and that the least significant bit y
n
is hard-core for
this permutation. We discuss the proofs of this. For further details, the reader is referred to the
original articles of Ben-Or, Chor and Shamir (1983) and Alexi, Chor, Goldreich and Schnorr
(1988).
First, we introduce some notions and results from elementary number theory that will be
necessary to understand the proofs.
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1.1 Number theoretic preliminaries.
The subset of integers inZ
m
that are co-prime with m is a multiplicative group, denoted byZ
m
.
Let x be an element ofZ
m
, for which there exists an element y  Z
m
such that x  y2 modm.
Such an x is called a quadratic residue modulo m, and the set of all quadratic residues modulo m
is denoted by QR
m
.
If x2 mod m equals y2 modm, then mjx2  y2 and hence mjx yx y. In case m is a
prime number, this implies that x  y modm; a quadratic residue modulo a prime p has exactly
two square roots. In particular, the square roots of 1 modulo p are 1 and 1 mod p. A further
immediate consequence is that exactly half of the elements modulo p are quadratic residues.
It is well-known thatZ
p
is cyclic when p is a prime, which means that there exists an element
g  Z

p
the powers of which exhaust all of Z
p
. Since Z
p
contains p  1 elements, the order of
g equals p  1. If a is even, then ga2 mod p is a square root of ga modp. Because exactly half
of the elements in f0     p  2g are even, the quadratic residues modulo p are precisely those
elements that are an even power of g. For x  Z
p
, the Legendre symbol xp of x modulo p is
defined to equal 1 if and only if x is a quadratic residue modulo p, otherwise it equals 1. We
already mentioned that the square roots of 1 modulo p are1 and 1. From Fermat’s little theorem
we hence have that xp12  1 mod p. In combination with the foregoing, it easily follows
that xp12  xp mod p, since each x  Z
p
can be written as ga mod p for some unique
a  f0     p 2g. This is called Euler’s criterion. In particular, if the prime p is congruent to 3
modulo 4 then p 12 is odd, and by Euler’s criterion1 is not a quadratic residue modulo p.
This fact will turn out to be of crucial importance for the construction of the one-way permutation.
If m is the product of two distinct primes p and q, then from the Chinese Remainder theorem
it follows that Z
m
is isomorphic to Z
p
 Z

q
, with an isomorphism that maps x  Z
m
onto
x mod p x mod q. A particular consequence of this is that a number x is a quadratic residue
modulo m if and only if it is a quadratic residue modulo both p and q. For x  Z
m
, the Jacobi
symbol xm of x modulo m is defined to equal xpxq. Contrary to the Legendre symbol,
x need not be a quadratic residue modulo m if its Jacobi symbol modulo m equals 1, since its
Legendre symbols modulo both p and q may equal 1. As a matter of fact, a consequence of the
isomorphism betweenZ
m
andZ
p
Z

q
is that precisely half of the elements ofZ
m
have Jacobi
symbol 1, and only half of these elements are quadratic residues. Since obviously none of the
elements with Jacobi symbol 1 can be a quadratic residue modulo m, exactly one quarter of
the elements ofZ
m
are quadratic residues. From a simple counting argument it follows that each
quadratic residue modulo m has exactly four square roots modulo m.
1.2 The permutation.
Now consider the case that m is the product of two distinct odd primes p and q that are both
congruent to 3 modulo 4, and that have approximately equal binary length. Composites of this
form are called, as mentioned in Part I, Blum integers. We will denote the binary length of m by
k. From the above discussion, it follows that the Jacobi symbol of 1 modulo m is 1, whereas
1 is not a quadratic residue modulo m. From this and the Chinese remainder theorem it follows
that the outcome of the pair of Legendre symbols modulo both p and q of each of the four square
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roots of x2 modm is equal to precisely one of 11, 1 1, 11 and 1 1. In particular,
exactly one of the four roots of a quadratic residue modulo a Blum integer is itself a quadratic
residue.
In other words, the mapping f
m
: QR
m
 QR
m
defined by
f
m
x  x
2 modm 2
induces a permutation on QR
m
. In order to formally apply the cryptographic theory that we
described in part I, we in fact need to define the permutation such that m is included as an
argument, i.e., fmx  mx2 modm. For simplicity, we will write m always as a subscript.
Although it is easy to prove (see Rabin, 1979) that the problem of inverting this permutation is
probabilistic polynomial-time equivalent to factoringm (in a manner similar to the proof we will
discuss shortly for a modification of (2)), the strongest known result (see Blum, Blum and Shub,
1986) for determining the least significant bit of its inverse is that it is as hard a task as solving the
so-called Quadratic Residuacity problem. This problem consists of distinguishing between the
quadratic residues and non-residues among the set of elements modulo a Blum integer that have
Jacobi symbol equal to 1. Although solving this problem is believed to require factoring of the
modulus, there is no proof known for this; assuming that the Quadratic Residuacity problem is
infeasible seems a stronger assumption than assuming that Blum integers are infeasible to factor.
Since we are interested in a bit generator whose pseudo-randomness follows rigorously from
the assumption that factoring is difficult, the definition of the permutation must be slightly
modified. For this, we first define
abs
m
z 

z modm if z modm  m2;
m z modm otherwise.
Redefine f
m
 as
f
m
x  abs
m
x
2 modm 3
Clearly, iterating this function we get precisely the recursion (2) defining the QR-generator. If
x
2 modm is not less than m2, then m  x2 modm is. Because the Legendre symbol, and
hence also the Jacobi symbol, is multiplicative, it follows that  m  ym  ym 
1mym  ym if m is a Blum integer. Consequently, exactly one square root of a
quadratic residue is less then m2, since every quadratic residue modulo m has exactly two
square roots with Jacobi symbol 1. Hence, the redefined f
m
 also induces a permutation, this
time on the set fx Z
m
j 0  x  m2 and xm  1g.
Just as for the original permutation (2), inverting f
m
 is probabilistic polynomial-time
equivalent to factoring the modulus. This can be seen as follows. On given as input a number
z  y
2 modm, such that 0  z  m2 and a square root y with Jacobi symbol -1 of z is known,
an algorithm for inverting f
m
 will output with probability lower-bounded by, say, 1k a
square root x of z in the domain of f
m
. Since xm  1, and we know that 1m  1,
it cannot be the case that x  y modm. Hence, pqjx  yx  y implies that exactly one
of p, q divides x y evenly. Using the Euclidean gcd-algorithm, gcdmx y can be feasibly
computed, thereby providing one (and hence both) of the prime factors of m. The probability
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that a randomly selected y Z
m
has Jacobi-symbol 1 is equal to 12, as is the probability that
0  z  m2. If y is uniformly distributed over the elements with Jacobi symbol 1, then z
is uniformly distributed over QR
m
. Define a Bernoulli experiment as consisting of generating at
random an element y  Z
m
, feeding z  y2 modm to the inverting algorithm in case z  m2
(otherwise, select a new y), and checking whether the output of the algorithm is a square root
of z. Then one need only do independent repetitions of this Bernoulli experiment an expected
number of 2k times in order to retrieve a square root that enables factoring of m. If  is a
polynomial in k, and the inverting algorithm runs in polynomial time, then this procedure runs in
expected polynomial time.
1.3 Sampling from the domain.
If we can prove that the least significant bit of f
m
 is hard-core, we are finished with the
proof that the QR-generator is pseudo-random assuming that Blum integers are infeasible to
factor. Before turning to this issue, we verify the necessary conditions for one-way permutations
mentioned earlier. Namely, the number of Blum integers of length k must grow exponentially
with k, and pairs mx must be feasibly samplable at random.
The Prime Number theorem states that the number of primes less than n is asymptotic to
n log n. Furthermore, Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in a progression states that the fraction of
primes congruent to a mod b, with gcda b  1, asymptotically has constant density (namely,
1b) among the set of all primes. From this, it follows easily that there are indeed exponentially
many (in k) Blum integers.
By performing independent Bernoulli experiments, randomly and independently picking in
each experiment an integer of specified binary length and checking it for primality, the expected
number of experiments needed to hit upon a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4 of a specified
length is polynomial (in particular, linear) in the specified length. Since there exist well-known
probabilistic algorithms for verifying primality in polynomial time, this shows that Blum integers
can be feasibly sampled according to a uniform distribution by repeating this procedure twice.
The other part of the argument (seed) of the QR-generator is a randomly chosen quadratic
residue in Z
m
. Because Z
m
Z
m
 1 if m  , a randomly selected y  f0 1gk has a very
high probability of being in Z
m
. This can be checked in polynomial time using the Euclidean
gcd-algorithm. Now set x  y2 modm then by elementary probability theory, x has been chosen
from QR
m
with uniform probability.
It is amusing that in a theory which depends on the notion of a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm to characterise feasible and infeasible problems, one should go to so much trouble
to describe how randomness can be generated, or rather expanded, in a deterministic way. A
probabilistic algorithm is supposed to be able to generate its own fair coin tosses, so looking from
inside the theory, random number generators are not needed; they already exist!
1.4 The hard-core bit.
The hardest and most lengthy part of the proof is to show that the existence of a feasible algorithm
that can guess the least significant bit of f1
m
 with a probability of success significantly
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exceeding 1/2 can be used to construct a feasible algorithm for inverting f1
m
. Together with
the result of Subsection 1.2, such a polynomial-time reduction implies that the least significant bit
of f
m
 is essentially as hard to determine as factoring the modulus. As required by the general
construction of Blum and Micali for pseudo-random bit generators, the reduction must work even
if the success probability of the algorithm only ‘slightly’ exceeds 1/2. We will henceforth denote
by Olsb an ‘oracle’ that, on given as inputs a Blum integer m and a number x in the range of
f
m
, outputs a guess for the least significant bit of f1
m
x that is correct with probability at least
12  1kc for some constant c.
The main idea to construct a feasible algorithm that inverts f
m
 by calling Olsb at most
polynomially many times is to retrieve the inverse of f
m
 by using a greatest common divisor
algorithm. To this end, two randomly chosen multiples of f
m
x are computed, f
m
ax modm
and f
m
bx modm, and an attempt is made to compute the greatest common divisor of ax
m
and bx
m
by manipulating the ‘permuted values’ f
m
ax modm and f
m
bx modm. Let us
call this an ‘experiment’. Here, y
m
denotes the value congruent modulo m to y such that
m2  y
m
 m2. Note that y modm and y
m
are related in the following way:
y
m


y modm if y modm  m2;
y modmm otherwise.
Furthermore, f
m
y
m
  f
m
y modm and, denoting absolute value by j  j, jy
m
j  abs
m
y.
When the gcd-algorithm has finished, a representation of gcdax
m
 bx
m
 in the form dx
m
should be known, such that d and f
m
dx modm ( f
m
dx
m
) are known. If ax
m
and bx
m
are co-prime then dx
m
 1, and so f
m
dx  1. Although f
m
dx modm  1 does not
necessarily imply that dx
m
 1 (since 1 has four square roots modulo m), we can always
check whether this is the case by comparing f
m
d
1 modm to f
m
x. If these values are
equal, then we have a good chance that one of d1 modm,d1 modm is in the domain of f
m

and we are finished. (Computation of inverses modulo m can be done in polynomial time using
the Extended Euclidean algorithm; the prime factorisation of m need not be known for this.)
Otherwise, we perform a new experiment, i.e., select new a and b (independently) and start over
again.
We are only interested in whether the outcome of an experiment is or is not equal to x, so this
is in fact a Bernoulli experiment. Suppose for the moment that we are indeed able to construct
the above inverting algorithm. By a theorem of Dirichlet, the probability that two randomly
chosen integers less than m are co-prime tends to a constant (namely 62) as m tends to infinity.
Hence, the Bernoulli experiment of selecting two random multiples of f
m
x and running the
gcd-algorithm has a probability of retrieving x that equals a constant fraction of the probability
that the gcd-algorithm outputs the correct answer. Consequently, if the probability that the gcd-
algorithm outputs the correct answer can be lower-bounded by the inverse of some polynomial
in k, then the experiment need only be repeated an expected number of times that is polynomial
in k in order to retrieve x. As we will show, this expected running time will be blown up by
another polynomial factor due to the fact that we will have to run polynomially many copies of
the gcd-algorithm for each experiment, assuming one out of polynomially many possibilities in
each run. This still keeps the final running time polynomial!
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Therefore, we can invert f
m
x if a polynomial-time algorithm can be constructed that
implements the gcd-algorithm, using only Olsb. The Euclidean gcd-algorithm makes repeated
use of testing whether one integer is greater than the other. However, this algorithm cannot
feasibly be implemented by using only the permuted values, since from f
m
ax modm and
f
m
bx modm one cannot in general determine whether (the absolute value of) ax
m
exceeds
bx
m
; in fact, a feasible algorithm that can do such a test without erring can be simply converted
into one that factors m.
1.4.1 Constructing the gcd-algorithm.
What is needed is a gcd-algorithm that only has to make decisions based on the least significant bits
of the involved integers, since we have access toOlsb. This can be realised by using a binary gcd-
algorithm such as the Brent-Kung gcd-algorithm, although unfortunately the way this algorithm
(or any other known one) must make calls to Olsb turns out to be far from straightforward.
The Brent-Kung algorithm makes use of the following three tests. Firstly, if A and B
are two integers, not necessarily positive, and jAj and jBj are both even, then gcdAB 
2 gcdA2 B2. Secondly, if jAj is odd and jBj even then gcdAB  gcdAB2. Thirdly,
if both jAj and jBj are odd, then gcdAB  gcdA A B2  gcdA A B2, and
the absolute value of exactly one of AB2, AB2 is even again. We assign that value
to B. Because of the third test, we can iterate. If necessary we must swap A and B before
we enter the third test to make sure that the absolute value of B exceeds that of A. In that
way, we are guaranteed to keep on making progress and finally obtain the greatest common
divisor in A. As a matter of fact, we might as well test whether A and B should be swapped
by comparing their binary lengths lengthA and lengthB. This turns out to be crucial for
successful implementation of the ‘permuted’ version of the gcd-algorithm.
The precise description of the Brent-Kung algorithm is as follows. Given two integers A and
B such that lengthA lengthB  k and A odd, repeat the following steps until B  0:
Step 1. While lsbjBj  0 do B 	 B2; lengthB	 lengthB 1 end.
Step 2. If lengthB  lengthA then swap(A, B); swap(lengthA length(B)) end.
Step 3. If lsbjAB2j  0 then B 	 AB2 else B 	 AB2 end.
When the algorithm halts (B  0), the variable A contains the greatest common divisor we were
looking for. A simple counting argument reveals that no more than 6k  3 evaluations of lsb
are needed until B becomes zero. Notice that if A is not odd, then lsbjA  B2j in step 3
makes no sense; this is not a problem since we can reduce A beforehand to make it odd.
With A  ax
m
and B  bx
m
, this algorithm can be implemented while working only with
f
m
ax modm and f
m
bx modm, given access to Olsb. We first introduce the notation par
m

for lsbabs
m
. Note that
lsbjBj  lsbjbx
m
j  par
m
bx modm
In order to obtain lsbjBj we must hence build an algorithm that computes par
m
 for
elements inZ
m
, using Olsb.
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Secondly, note that if jBj is even, then B2 (which is equal to bx
m
2) may be computed
as 21b modmx
m
. This follows from the fact that one can apply the modulo m operator on
intermediate results. Although we never know B explicitly since we do not know x, we can keep
track of B by keeping track of b. Furthermore, lengthB can be kept track of by diminishing a
counter each time B is (implicitly) divided by 2 in Step 1. In that way, we can also make sure
that we know when to (implicitly) swap A and B.
Of course, similar relations can be applied for Step 3 of the gcd-algorithm; we can implicitly
compute AB2 as 21a b modmx
m
, and hence keep track of this value by working
with 21a b modm.
We are now prepared to describe in detail how the inverting algorithm works, based on the
permuted gcd-algorithm. Suppose we are given a Blum integerm and f
m
x for some unknown x
in the domain of f
m
 that is to be determined. Generate independently at random two elements
a b  Z

m
, and set lengthA  lengthB  k  1. For the moment, just assume that A is odd
(we will return to this shortly). Repeat the following steps until b  0:
Step 1. While par
m
bx modm  0 do b	 21b modm; lengthB	 lengthB 1 end.
Step 2. If lengthB  lengthA then swap(a, b); swap(lengthA length(B)) end.
Step 3. If par
m
21abxmodm  0 then b	 21abmodm; else b	 21abmodm
end.
If all calls to par
m
 were answered correctly (otherwise, the procedure might not halt in
polynomial time), then in the end A contains the greatest common divisor. Although we only
know A implicitly, we have kept track of a. Due to the fact that squaring modulo m is a
multiplicative function, we can compute f
m
A:
f
m
A  f
m
ax modm  abs
m
a
2 modmf
m
x modm
since we know f
m
x. As mentioned earlier, if f
m
A  1 then with high probability A  1.
We already explained how to determine if a1 modm equals x. If we were unsuccessful, we
choose new a b Z
m
and do another experiment.
It remains to build a feasible algorithm for determining par
m
 for elements inZ
m
fromOlsb.
Although we do not explicitly know the numbers we want to know par
m
 of, since they are
all multiples of the unknown number x, we do have some information about them. Namely, we
kept track of a and b. As shown above, lsbjBj  par
m
bx modm, and we know b. Likewise,
lsbjAB2j  par
m
21a bx modm. In other words, all requests for par
m
 are of the
form par
m
dx modm such that d  Z
m
is known. We will show shortly how this can be put to
use. An important thing to note is that abs
m
dx modm gets smaller all the time, since jAj and
jBj decrease as the gcd-algorithm progresses. That is, if the values jAj  abs
m
ax modm and
jBj  abs
m
bx modm are ‘small’ to begin with, then all values dx modm for which par
m
 is
requested are also small in this sense (unless the parity algorithm makes mistakes!).
To make sure that an experiment, in which we attempt to retrieve the greatest common divisor,
will not loop more than a polynomial number of steps (which can happen if the bit determined
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for par
m
 is incorrect), the number of times that par
m
 is requested must be kept track of in a
counter. If the counter exceeds the strict upper bound (6k  3 in this case), then something went
wrong and the specific run of the experiment can be halted.
Finally, we mentioned that A must be odd. This is simple to resolve: either we do not care
whether A is odd (since this only happens only with probability 1/2) and then the ‘upper-bound’
mechanism takes care of it, or we test par
m
ax modm in advance using the same mechanism
we need anyway.
1.4.2 Constructing the parity algorithm.
The basic idea of the construction of the parity algorithm is to infer par
m
dxmodn by comparing
the least significant bits of s  dx modm and s, for randomly chosen s  Z
bm2c. Only if no
‘wraparound’ 0 occurs when s is added to dx, then
par
m
dx modn  lsbs
 lsbs dx modm 4
This relation will allow us to compute par
m
 using Olsb. To ensure that wraparounds have low
probability of occurrence, we define dx modm to be ‘small’ if and only if abs
m
dx modm 
mk for some polynomial . If dx modm is small, then the probability of a wraparound 0
is less than 1k if s is uniformly distributed. We will return to this in detail when we discuss
the potential sources of errors.
Now, A and B are not known explicitly, and so for randomly chosen s the values of s 
dx modm (and in particular their least significant bits) are all unknown as well. However, we
have access to Olsb, which outputs (with some advantage over guessing) least significant bits
of arbitrary numbers that are in the domain (!) of f
m
, when given their permuted values.
Hence, we can still be successful if there is a way to compute the permuted values f
m
s and
f
m
s  dx modm of s resp. s dx modm, for randomly chosen s. This is where the fact that
we always know d comes in. Namely,
f
m
dx modm  abs
m
d
2 modmf
m
x
which can be computed since we know f
m
x.
There is one complication here: in contrast to the method for generating ‘multiplicative
randomisations’, such as f
m
dx modm, it is not known how to feasibly generate ‘additive
randomisations’ such as f
m
s  dx modm for which s itself is known. Indeed, a feasible
algorithm for doing so would be a major step towards a feasible algorithm for factoring. Therefore,
we use the fact that
f
m
rx dx modm  abs
m
f
m
r  d modmf
m
x modm
so rx modm can play the role of s. Now the complication is obvious: s  rx modm itself is
not known, and so when using (4) we must ask Olsb also for lsbs. This causes the undesirable
effect of ‘error-doubling’ when querying Olsb. In fact, it is not even known whether s generated
in this way is less than m2 (again, a feasible algorithm for determining this would lead to a
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simple algorithm for factoring!) which, as we already mentioned (albeit without explanation),
must be the case.
From this discussion it will be clear that there are various potential sources for errors when
trying to apply (4) using Olsb. We next consider these in detail, in order to determine a strategy
for controlling them.
1.4.3 Potential sources of errors.
At this point, the reader may want to skip over to Subsection 1.5, if he is not concerned with the
gory details of the error-sources and how to control them.
Let us consider what happens when we try to compute par
m
 based on (4) by using Olsb
. We feed Olsb with fms modm and fms  dx modm, and take the exclusive-or of the
two outputs as a guess for par
m
dx modm. This is called a dx-measurement. The correctness
of a dx-measurement cannot feasibly be verified. Nevertheless, if a dx-measurement would be
correct with probability that exceeds 12 by some fraction that is lower-bounded by the inverse
of some polynomial in k, then one can perform a great many (say jk for some polynomial j)
dx-measurements by choosing r independently at random in each dx-measurement. Considering
the majority value obtained in all dx-measurements as a final guess for par
m
dx modm, the
probability that the final guess is correct can then be lower-bounded if the measurements are all
independent: the Chernoff bound gives a lower bound of 1  O12jk. That is, the calls for
par
m
 in an experiment are returned correctly with probability almost 1.
However, the oracle Olsb itself is allowed to err with probability close to 12. So, even if
the error probability of the oracle would be the only source of errors in a dx-measurement, then
the probability that the exclusive-or is not equal to the true least significant bit of dx modm
can still be almost twice the error probability of Olsb. Since we query Olsb for two numbers
in a dx-measurement, we need an error-probability for par
m
dx mod m that exceeds 12 by a
significant fraction in order to make sure that the majority outcome is almost always correct.
To overcome this problem, the dx-measurement procedure is modified such that the least
significant bit of s is known beforehand with at least ‘significant’ probability. One can then query
Olsb in all jk trials for lsbsi  dx modm, 1  i  jk, only. The error probability in a dx-
measurement can then be approximated by the error probability ofOlsb, and we may realistically
hope that the probability of error in a single dx-measurement still significantly exceeds 1/2.
Before we show how to do this, we need to be aware that there are two additional potential
sources of errors in dx-measurements, other than the errors made by the oracle. We already
mentioned that a wraparound 0 may occur, in which case the right-hand side of (4) does not equal
par
m
dx modm, and that this happens with probability less than 1jmj if dx modm is small.
We also noticed earlier that if ax modm and bx modm are both small to begin with, then all the
values that are assigned in the gcd-algorithm to ax modm and bx modm (through their permuted
values) are small as well (i.e., the values dxmodm for which the parity is requested, are all small)
if par
m
is always returned correctly. Since  is a polynomial, the probability that axmodm and
bx modm are both small to begin with is lower-bounded by the inverse of some polynomial in k,
so one out of an expected number of polynomially many experiments contains such ax modm
and bx modm. This very important detail enables us to easily take care of this error source: by
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performing polynomially many independent experiments, we only need an expected number of
experiments that is polynomial in k in order to have two values a and b for which ax modm
and bx modm are both small. In that particular experiment, this type of error has a very small
probability, if only we make sure that s is uniformly distributed over 0  s  m2 instead of
overZ
m
. Notice that there is some peculiar interaction here: all the values for which par
m
 is
requested will only get smaller throughout the gcd-algorithm if par
m
 is (with overwhelming
probability) correctly computed each time, and vice versa the probability that a wraparound 0
occurs is small if the value for which par
m
 is requested is small.
A second source of potential errors was also drawn attention to before: the success probability
of Olsb exceeds 1/2 by some ‘significant’ fraction only on the domain of fm. If the oracle
is queried for lsbs  dx modm (recall that in the revised procedure we just announced for
sampling the oracle, we will no longer query the oracle for lsbs), the bit that the oracle outputs
does not necessarily help us: if s dx modm is not in the domain of f
m
, then the outcome of
Olsb corresponds to the inverse of fms dx modm, a value that does not equal s dx modm.
There are two situations in which this may happen: the first is if sdx modm has Jacobi symbol
modulo m equal to 1, the second if s  dx modm is greater than m2. The first situation is
easy to detect without knowing x, since s dxm  r  dmxm  r  dm because
s  rx modm and xm  1. (Although from the definition of the Jacobi symbol it seems
that one must be able to factor in order to compute Jacobi symbols modulo m, the Quadratic
Reciprocity theorem of Gauss provides a feasible algorithm for this task without ever using the
factoring of m.) If this happens, Olsb will not be queried but the flip of a fair coin will be used as
a guess for par
m
dx modm. In this situation, our guess is correct with probability exactly 1/2.
The second situation happens with very small probability if dx modm is small, which we can
take care of by choosing the polynomial  appropriately large and s  m2 (exactly as in the
first potential source of errors).
1.4.4 Implementing the dx-measurements.
As mentioned, to overcome error-doubling the jk points s
i
 r
i
x modm, 1  i  jk,
with known least significant bit are generated according to the following procedure. Generate
independently at random two elements u v ofZ
m
, and denote ux modm by y and vx modm by
z. Although y and z are not known, all possibilities for their least significant bits can be tried, as
well as their location in one of the intervals ijkcm i 1jkcm for 0  i  jkc for
some suitable constant c  1. In total, there are 4jk2c possibilities that have to be considered, of
which only one is correct. For 1  i  jk, define s
i
 r
i
xmodm to equal abs
m
yiz modm.
Then s
i
 m2 as we required. Since y and z are known up to mjkc, y iz modm is known
up to at most 2mjkc1. The probability that y iz modm does not fall in an interval of length
2mjkc around 0 or m2 is 4jkc1 (since it is uniformly distributed over Z
m
), and in that
case the least significant bit of s
i
can be computed correctly from the least significant bits of y
and z, and the value of i.
Although it is not known what the location of y and z is, nor what their least significant
bits are, the fact that there are only polynomially many possibilities implies that there are only
polynomially many possible values that the ‘vector’ s1     s
jk
 can take on: each guess for the
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location of y and z and their least significant bits, specifies exactly one such possibility. Hence,
each of the values that the vector s1     s
jk
 can take on can be tried for when doing the jk
dx-measurements.
Assume for the moment that we are dealing with the possibility in which the values we
assigned to s1     s
jk
are indeed the correct ones. Taking all the error sources into account, it
can easily be shown that the total error probability in each one of all jk dx-measurements in
which these correct least significant bits for s
i
are used, is still greater than 1/2 by a fraction that
is lower-bounded by the inverse of some polynomial in k (i.e., it is still ‘significantly greater than
1/2), if only dxmodm is small. Although the jk points s
i
generated in this way are not mutually
independent (if they were, then we would have to enumerate exponentially many possibilities for
the least significant bits, which would not be sufficient to prove the desired result!), and hence
the Chernoff bound cannot be used, it is not hard to show that they are pairwise independent.
Therefore we can still apply Chebyshev’s inequality to lower-bound the probability of correctness
of the majority vote by 1O1jk.
The way we use this for the inverting algorithm is as follows. In one experiment (i.e., using
one pair of values for a b), par
m
dx mod m must be evaluated for polynomially many values
of d. For each of these polynomially many calls for par
m
, we generate u v at random, we can
enumerate polynomially many possible values for the vector s1     s
jk
 that we can derive
from u v, and use these s
i
values in dx-measurements. In each of these polynomially many
situations, the majority outcome of the dx-measurements is taken as a guess for par
m
. We
know for sure that in one of all these situations we assumed the correct values for each of the s
i
; in
that particular case, the majority vote of the dx-measurements is a guess for par
m
 that is correct
with probability close to 1. In all the other copies, the returned guess for par
m
 might be wrong
with considerable probability, and those runs of the experiment might not halt in polynomial time;
however, this is taken care of by the strict upper-bound mechanism. In essence, we are running
polynomially (for each of the calls to par
m
) times polynomially (for each of the possible values
of the vector) many copies of each experiment, which is a polynomial number of copies. Since
we already showed that only an expected number of polynomially many experiments is needed
to find the inverse, the proof is completed.
1.5 Applying the construction of Blum and Micali.
By using the general construction of Blum and Micali that we described in Part I, taking as a seed
a random element mx0  QRm with m in the set of Blum integers, one obtains a bit generator
which at the n-th step outputs the least significant bit of the second argument of fnmx, where
fmx 

mx
2 modm if x2 modm  m2;
mm x
2 modm otherwise.
If the problem of factoring Blum integers is infeasible, then the generator passes all polynomial-
time statistical tests. By combining the bits in groups of suitable size, and considering this as the
binary representation of an integer, one can construct number generators.
Alternatively, the QR-generator can be defined by the recurrence
x
n
 x
2
n1 modm
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such that the bits
y
n
 lsbabs
m
x
n

are output. That is, we compute the sequence x
n
, and at each stage extract either the least
significant bit of x
n
(in case x
n
 m2) or complement it (if x
n
 m2). Clearly, for the same
seed this produces exactly the same sequence of bits.
2 Further developments.
In this section we briefly touch upon further developments of the cryptographic theory.
2.1 Hard-core predicates of multiple bits.
A possible handicap in practice of generators based on the construction of Blum and Micali is
that only one bit (the hard-core bit) is output per iteration of the one-way permutation. One would
like to be able to extract at each stage more bits than just one in order to increase the efficiency.
The first idea that comes to mind is to try to come up with other (hard-core bits) of the
permutation f under consideration that are hard-core as well. For example, for the permutation
defining the QR-generator, it can be shown that each of the bits in the jk least significant
positions is hard-core, if jk  Olog k. However, it would be wrong to output at each
iteration all the bits that have individually been proven hard-core, because besides having the
information fx, which by itself is not enough to compute a certain given hard-core bits of x,
extra information is released (namely other hard-core bits).
As an extreme example one can think of a one-way permutation defined on a domain consisting
entirely of elements for which both the most and the least significant bit have equal parity.
Although these bits may be proven individually hard-core, revealing the least significant bit
makes the most significant bit completely predictable. In the output sequence of the generator
obtained when applying the construction of Blum and Micali this is readily apparent, since it
consists of a stream of bits that are pairwise the same.
Hence, a notion of simultaneously hard-core bits is needed. This notion informally amounts
to the requirement that no feasible algorithm can guess with significant probability of success
any of the hard-core bits of the argument x of the one-way permutation f even when, in
addition to fx, it is given all the other hard-core bits of fx. This requirement in fact follows
straightforwardly from the conditions that must obviously be satisfied in order to mathematically
justify outputting all these bits at each iteration in the Blum-Micali construction. By extending
the proof techniques sketched in the previous section, it has been shown in Alexi, Chor, Goldreich
and Schnorr (1988) that the least Olog k bits of the function defining the QR-generator in fact
are simultaneously hard-core, and hence they can all be output per iteration of the permutation.
The resulting generator is still pseudo-random under the assumption that it is infeasible to factor
Blum integers.
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2.2 Weakening the theoretical assumptions.
While the existence of a one-way permutation in the Blum-Micali construction is sufficient for
the existence of pseudo-random bit generators, it is not necessary. Weaker conditions were given
by Yao (1982), who showed in a constructive manner that it is sufficient to assume the existence
of a one-way function; it need not be a permutation. In fact, it is sufficient if the function is
‘somewhat’ one-way, meaning that any feasible algorithm that tries to find an inverse of elements
in the range of the function has a probability of failure that is lower-bounded by the inverse of
some polynomial in the length of the input. That is, it must have some probability ‘significantly’
bigger than zero of failing to find an inverse, rather than an overwhelming probability. The idea
is to transform any somewhat one-way function into a strongly one-way function, which in turn
can be transformed into a more complicated one-way permutation that has a hard-core predicate.
This permutation can be used in the Blum-Micali construction, which gives the desired result.
The first result to state necessary as well as sufficient conditions is due to Levin (1985). It
is based on the existence of a special subclass of all one-way functions, those that are one-way
on iterates. Intuitively, this condition ensures that the successively induced ensembles of strings
in the range of the function do not ‘degenerate’ too soon. Using a special concept that he called
isolation, Levin proved that there exists a pseudo-random bit generator if and only if there exists a
function that is one-way on iterates. This theorem has the drawback that it seems quite difficult to
test the plausibility of the assumption that f is one-way on iterates. Also, it is not satisfactory
in the sense that it is not clear if the existence of such special one-way functions is equivalent to
the existence of ordinary one-way functions.
A step closer in this direction was made by the introduction by Goldreich, Krawczyk and Luby
(1988) of another, larger subclass of all one-way functions, called regular one-way functions.
This condition comes down to the requirement that all elements in the range of f have the
same number of preimages, and enabled them to prove that if there exists a regular function that
is one-way, then there exists a pseudo-random bit generator. The main advantage of the notion
of regularity is that many quite naturally arising functions are regular, so if any one of these
can be shown to be one-way (under some plausible assumption) then this result can be used to
construct a pseudo-random bit generator. The proof of this theorem is based on a feasible method
to transform regular functions into functions that are one-way on iterates, after which Levin’s
theorem can be applied.
The most recent theoretic results in this area have shown that all of the above notions are in
fact equivalent. Namely, a theorem of Impaggliazzo, Levin, Luby and Hastad states that there
exists a one-way function if and only if there exists a pseudo-random generator. Actually, this
was shown to hold in the non-uniform model by Impaggliazzo, Levin and Luby (1989), and
later in the uniform model by Hastad (1990). (The difference between uniform and non-uniform
complexity is something that we have deliberately not touched upon, since we expect the readers
of this article to be mainly statistically oriented. The relevance of this difference only derives
from the details of the proofs of certain theoretical constructions.) The proof techniques of
Impaggliazzo, Levin, Luby and Hastad are quite complicated and use entirely different concepts
(such as entropy) than those used to prove the earlier results. An open problem is whether the
construction given in the proof of this theorem can be made efficient for practical use (i.e., a
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low-degree polynomial upper-bound for the running times of the generator). The construction
applied in the proofs results in a generator that has a running time bounded from below by a high
degree polynomial; in practice it seems that the generators arising from the construction of Blum
and Micali are the most efficient ones. The most efficient of all the known generators based on
the construction of Blum and Micali is the QR-generator, which we described in the previous
section.
3 Conclusion.
Although pseudo-randomness of the QR-generator arising from the cryptographic theory is based
on a highly respectable assumption, it is likely that it performs better with respect to the standard
and stringent statistical tests than the classical statistical methods, even if the assumption turns
out not to be true. This is due to the fact that a statistical test that is not passed by the QR-
generator will probably be extremely non-elementary (as the proof of pseudo-randomness for
the QR-generator suggests). As a consequence of this, one can even expect the cryptographic
methods to do better in this respect if (almost) all of the bits are output at each stage, instead
of just the bits that are simultaneously hard-core (even though the thus arising generators are
perhaps no longer pseudo-random in the theoretical sense).
In fact, although the important results of the cryptographic generators are asymptotic, one can
expect the cryptographic generators to do better even when small parameter choices are involved.
A detailed (and tedious) examination of the proofs of the theoretical results and the QR-generator
reveals that one can get some definite statements such as ‘If Blum integers with k bits cannot be
factored using less than n1 bit operations then no bit of the QR-generator with a modulus of k bits
can be predicted with any algorithm using less than n2 bit operations’, for a value of n2 depending
on n1. All the above obviously holds as well for other generators that have been proposed in the
cryptographic literature.
It is interesting to investigate how many bits of the integers produced at each iteration of the
cryptographic generators can be output such that all the standard and stringent statistical tests are
passed, and what length of the parameters of the cryptographic generators is necessary to ensure
that all standard and stringent statistical tests are passed. In particular, it is interesting to examine
what the performance is of for example the QR-generator if a small modulus is chosen. A small
amount of practical experience with the QR-generator (Brands, 1991), suggests that it is certainly
as good, in the traditional sense of passing traditional statistical tests of randomness, as a linear
congruential generator of similar size of which the most significant bit is output at each iteration.
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